Judicial Activism and Restraint on the United States Supreme Court: A Political-Behavioral Analysis by Handberg, Roger B. & Hill, Jr., Harold F.
California Western Law Review 
Volume 20 Number 2 Article 1 
1-1-1984 
Judicial Activism and Restraint on the United States Supreme 
Court: A Political-Behavioral Analysis 
Roger B. Handberg 
Harold F. Hill, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Handberg, Roger B. and Hill, Jr., Harold F. (1984) "Judicial Activism and Restraint on the United States 
Supreme Court: A Political-Behavioral Analysis," California Western Law Review: Vol. 20 : No. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 20 Cal. W. L. Rev. 173 1983-1984 
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Wed Sep 28 15:26:10 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
1
Handberg and Hill, Jr.: Judicial Activism and Restraint on the United States Supreme Cour
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 20 1984 NUMBER 2
Judicial Activism and Restraint on the United
States Supreme Court: A Political-
Behavioral Analysis
ROGER B. HANDBERG*
HAROLD F. HILL, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines judicial activisim and restraint on the
United States Supreme Court in the context of the changing elec-
toral majorities.' Over the years the Supreme Court's role has
been challenged most strenuously during periods of political and
social change. 2 The main concern during these transition periods
has been what impact judicial policy decisions will have on the
newly elected national political majority. Specifically, how the
Court's policy decisions will hinder or facilitate the consolidation
of power by the new political majority.3
In light of the concern directed towards the Supreme Court on
its potential political effect, the pressures placed upon the individ-
ual justices are tremendous. This, especially given the judicial tra-
ditions which at one level glorify the jurist who stands alone
* Associate Dean of Graduate Studies, Professor of Political Science, Univer-
sity of Central Florida. B.A., Florida State University, 1966; Ph.D., University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1970.
** Director of Capital Facilities Improvement, Orange County, Florida. B.A.,
University of Central Florida, 1973; M.A., University of Central Florida, 1977.
1. Past discussions of judicial activism and restraint have focused on what role
the Supreme Court plays within our democratic political system. Unfortunately,
these discussions have often been caught up in the debate over the partisan controver-
sies of the day. For example, judicial restraint advocates were often partisans of the
New Deal politics of the 1930's, whereas in the 1960's the restrainist position was
supported by the more conservative groups on the national political spectrum. No-
vak, Economic Activism and Restraint, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT
(S. Halpem & C. Lamb eds. 1982).
2. Caldeira & McCrone, Of Time and Judicial Activism: 4 Study of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1800-1973, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (S. Hal-
pern & C. Lamb eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Caldeira & McCrone].
3. Caldeira & McCrone, supra note 2, at 104.
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against the crowd, while at the other extreme praise deference
shown the elected political branches. 4 Therefore, what has devel-
oped is a generally accepted notion that judicial activism will only
be justified at those relatively rare junctures when necessary to
protect fundamental values and freedoms.5
Noted scholars have developed explanations on how the justices
perceive the Court's judicial role.6 All such explanations are pre-
mised upon individual justices evaluating the facts and law and
then acting in accordance with their view of the proper judicial
role.7 Most justices, however, are not as open on personal deci-
sional predispositions relative to exercising judicial power as were
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, who were often identified as
polar opposites in the process of reconciling opposites.3 There-
fore, the analysis herein examines judicial activism and restraint
within a broader context, considering the Supreme Court's reac-
tions to changes in the national electorate.
I. EARLIER VIEWS
In 1957, Robert Dahl examined the role of the Supreme Court
in the democratic political system.9 Dahl discussed the Court's
role as a reflection of fundamental political forces in society and
4. Schick, JudicialActivism on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT AcTIv-
ISM AND RESTRAINT 39 (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 1982).
5. This judicial activism clearly conflicts with the more usual posture of the
justices, which is deference to the other branches of government. This deference is
evidenced in several ways. For example, the federal government has won a dispro-
portionate number of its administrative agency cases. Throughout the period from
1801-1958 the United States Government, in fact prevailed an average of sixty-two
percent (62%) when they were a litigant in the case. Handberg, Supreme Court and
Administrative Agencies: 1965-1978, 6 J. OF CONTEMP. L. 161, 161-76 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Handberg, Supreme Court]. Further, only rarely were federal statutes,
or for that matter, state statutes struck down as unconstitutional. Moreover, the pre-
sumption as indicated in theAshwander rules, is that government statutes are consti-
tutional, with the burden of proving otherwise upon the challenger. Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936). This presumption further sup-
ports the government's positions, barring infringement of certain specific constitu-
tional guarantees. In fact, the question has really become when, and under what
limited conditions or circumstances will the court be willing to assume a position of
judicial activism. Miller, In Defense ofJudicialActivism, in SUPREME COURT AcTIv-
ISM AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 1982).
6. Champagne & Nagel, The Advocates of Restraint: Holmes, Brandeis, Stone
and Frankfurter, in SUPREME COURT AcTIvIsM AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C.
Lamb eds. 1982).
7. Id.
8. Cf. Id. at 312 (The cases cited indicate the opposite views held by Justices
Frankfurter and Douglas).
9. Dahli, Decision Making in a Democracy. The Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 6 J. OF PUB. L. 279 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Dahi, Decision
Making].
[Vol. 20
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not in terms of the specific justices.' 0 Dahi's arguments opposed
what he termed the dominant legal myth that the Court's judicial
activism served to protect oppressed minorities." Basically, what
DahI contended was that contrary to the myth, the Court does not
function as champion of minority group rights against the law
making majority.' 2 This theory was premised on the fact that the
court's membership is inevitably part of the dominant national co-
alition. That is, the justices by their very recruitment are integral
parts of the national political electorate.' 3 Thus, according to
Dal, traditionally the Court, guided by restraint, operates as legi-
timator of political change rather than defender of the aggrieved.
The Court, Dahl claims, will therefore reject challenges to acts of
the new legislative majority by consistently asserting the statutes'
compatibility with the interpreted constitution.14
Dahl contended, however, that major breakdowns in judicial
restraint did occur when the existing majority coalition col-
lapsed.15 Since the justices have lifetime tenure, the Court's rela-
tive composition turned over at slower rates than Congress and
the executive. The result, therefore, were periods of conflict,
which only abated with vacancies through death or retirement of
the holdover justices.' 6
Dahl's analysis challenged the traditional view of what role the
Supreme Court fulfilled within the American political system.
Dah proposed that instead of the accepted judicial activist role of
protection for the oppressed and impartial dispenser of justice the
10. Id. at 280-81.
11. Id. at 282-83.
12. Id. at 285.
13. Dahi notes that on the average, during most presidential tenures the power to
appoint a new justice is exercised at least twice. Id. at 293-94.
14. Judicial activism in Dahl's analysis is defined in terms of those instances
where the Court struck a federal statute down as unconstitutional. Such actions were
seen by Dali as direct affronts to the political majority. Id. at 286-88.
15. Id. at 284-85.
16. Although, as pointed out by David Adamany in his examination of Dahl's
findings, Dahi did not find very lengthy periods of conflict to ever exist. According to
Adamany:
Dahl, in an essay very widely read in undergraduate political science
courses, . . . finds that virtually all "important" congressional policies
struck down by the Court within four years of enactment, and thus presuma-
bly while the sponsoring lawmaking majority was still intact, subsequently
are vindicated by further congressional action or judicial reversal; ascribes
this mainly to the President's appointment power, noting that on the average
a new justice is appointed every 22 [twenty-two] months; and concludes fi-
nally that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of
line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the
United States."
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court 1973 Wis. L. REv.
790, 793 [hereinafter cited as Adamany, Legitimacy].
1984]
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Court actually functions as legimator of acts by the dominant
political party.1 7 In other words, Dahl explained the Court's rela-
tively constant judicial restraint position as a product of political
recruitment.
Several years later Richard Funston examined and expanded
upon Dahl's thesis.' 8 In his dissertation, Funston reconceptual-
ized Dahl's approach' 9 in what Funston termed a "lag hypothe-
sis." Basically, Funston's theory or "lag hypothesis" was "that
over long periods of time the Supreme Court reflects the will of
the dominant political coalition, except during the transition peri-
ods when the court is a holdover relic of the old coalition." 20
Thus, Funston contended that the Court will more likely perform
the counter-majoritarian function traditionally ascribed to it, pri-
narily during periods of political transition. More precisely, judi-
cial activism becomes more likely during transitions because the
political value incongruity, between old and new, increased the
potential for conflicts.2' Funston's analysis, therefore, also as-
sumes that the tides of American politics determine levels of judi-
cial activism and restraint on the Court, rather than the relative
proclivities of the individual justices.22
Additionally, in his analysis, Funston compared Court activity
levels during periods of electoral realignment and nonrealignment
17. Dahl, Decision Making, supra note 9, at 279.
18. Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
793 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Funston, The Supreme Court].
19. Funston, in his evaluation of Dahl's study, felt there was more to be drawn
from the data that Dahl had examined, and concentrated his analysis on what the
Court does most of the time, stating:
Professor Dahl's tabular data, however, while persuasive, do not support his
conclusion on his point. Indeed they are completely unrelated to it. Rather,
the conclusion was apparently arrived at impressionistically on the basis of
logical deduction. When the court strikes down congressional legislation as
unconstitutional, Dahl demonstrated, it is seldom successful in the long run
in thwarting the majority policy. But the crucial point is that most of the
time the court will not be striking down national legislation. Dahl did not
examine this point at length, nor therefore, did he consider where the Court
would be most likely to act in a counter-majoritarian fashion.
Id. at 796.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 793.
22. The tides of change referred to in this Article are the changes of electoral
fortune which occurred at certain intervals in American politics. These changes are
fundamental in nature and permanent in effect. An example of such a period is the
time interval beginning in 1928 and continuing through the 1930's. During this pe-
riod the Republican party lost its hold on the electorate, or at least significant seg-
ments, most notably the northern working class. The result was an era of national
Democratic party dominance-a dominance that only began to deteriorate in the
1970's. A. CAMPBELL, A CLASSIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1966); J.
SUNDQuiST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 200-204 (1973). Further, the New
Deal coalition is an example of such a realignment of partisan loyalties, but on at
least three other occasions similar shifts have been identified. Id.
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against periods when the Court had been reconstituted by the
newly dominant political coalition. 23 Based upon concrete statis-
tics revealing three times greater a finding of unconstitutionality
during realignment, Funston concluded that "the traditional con-
cept of the Court as the champion of minority rights against ma-
jority demands is largely incorrect."' 24 Thus, according to Funston
minorities would be protected, if at all, through statutory interpre-
tation rather than declarations of unconstitutionality.
Funston's analysis has, however, been challenged for several
methodological errors. One noted scholar, Paul Beck, has criti-
cized Funston by pointing out that the time periods utilized by
him were inadequate.25 As well, Bradley C. Cannon and S. Sid-
ney Umer, in their own study of the Court,26 challenged Fun-
ston's results on the grounds of sample skewness. Specifically,
their main criticism was that Funston's use of the New Deal cases,
numbering fourteen in all, were too distorting, especially where
the total case sample numbered thirty-eight.27 This critique by
Cannon and Umer is quite important since it identifies the major
shortcoming of other earlier studies: an insufficient number of
cases used.
Both Dahl, who based his study on seventy-eight cases, 28 and
Funston, utilizing thirty-eight, 29 premised their analysis on the
Court's willingness to strike down federal legislative acts as un-
constitutional.30 Therefore, only a few cases, in fact, represented
instances where the Court struck down federal statutes as uncon-
stitutional. Moreover, Dahl only examined a four year period to
identify relevant cases. Dahl's assumption was that the congres-
sional majority initiating the challenged legislation would have
disappeared or have been significantly weakened by the end of the
23. Funston, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 809.
24. Funston found that "the Court has been more than three times as likely to
declare recently enacted deferral legislation unconstitutional during the realignment
periods identifed by Chambers and Burnham than it had been during the vast major-
ity of its history." Id. at 805-09.
25. Beck, Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Court After the
Horse, 70 POL. Sc. RE v. 930-31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Beck, Critical Election].
26. Cannon & Ulmer, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent, 70
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1215 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cannon & Ulmer, The Supreme
Court].
27. When Funston's indices were recomputed, deleting New Deal and later cases,
Cannon and Ulmer found that "there is no significant difference between the Court's
counter-majoritarian behavior in the lag periods and that in non-critical years." Id.
at 1218.
28. Dahl, Decision Making, supra note 9, at 279.
29. Funston, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 793.
30. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
ABRAHAM].
19841
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four years.3'
As for Funston's analysis, his much narrower sample repre-
sented those instances of judicial review occurring within periods
of electoral realignment.32 Unfortunately, as noted earlier, four-
teen of Funston's thirty-eight cases occurred during the New Deal
era. This fact is fatal to his analysis since the other three periods
of realignment are, in substance, deleted from his study.33
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
Earlier examinations of the political nature of judicial activism
and restraint have employed relatively narrow empirical focuses.
For both Dahl and Funston the relevant indicator of judicial ac-
tivism was whether or not the Court declared a federal statute un-
constitutional.34 Such an approach ignores other, less drastic,
decisional opportunities available to the Court such as denial of
review and statutory interpretation. For instance, in a more re-
cent view, Jonathan Casper pointed out that the Court can techni-
cally sustain a congressional statute and simultaneously
significantly change the content and direction of the governmental
policy.35 Therefore, if one conceives of a continuum of possible
judicial responses, the declaration of a statute's unconstitutional-
ity marks only one extreme in the continuum of Court action
available.
The approach applied herein considers a broader range of the
Court's aggregate decisional patterns over the period from 1801 to
1958. For purposes of this analysis, aggregate Court behavior will
be defined in terms of whether the Court accepted the govern-
ment's position when it was a party to the action. In other words,
whether the Court elected to engage in judicial restraint.
The Court, it can be assumed, will respond most favorably to
31. Dahl, Decision Making, supra note 9, at 279.
32. Funston, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 801-03.
33. Cannon & Ulmer, The Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 1215.
34. See supra notes 14, 21 and 24 and accompanying text.
35. Casper explains that "The Courts doctrine that it will, if at all possible, inter-
pret a statute in such a way as to 'save' it from being declared unconstitutional means
that the court will often significantly twist and change the ostensible provisions of a
statute." Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sc1.
REv. 50, 56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Casper, The Supreme Court]. Casper drama-
tizes this point rather effectively through the case of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956). In Nelson, an individual was being prosecuted under Pennsylvania's "Lit-
tle Smith Act," which was modeled after the federal Smith Act. The Court struck
down the state statute claiming, inter alia, that the relevant federal legislation was
intended to be exclusive and thus by invoking the supremacy clause, the Court invali-
dated the Pennsylvania statute. The Court defeated the statute, however, even though
the title was to take away or impair the jurisdiction and laws of the states. Casper,
The Supreme Court, supra note 35, at 56.
[Vol. 20
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government arguments during those periods in which its policy
preferences correspond closely to those of the dominant political
coalition. Conversely, when the political system is experiencing
an electoral realignment, the new coalition and previously consti-
tuted Court will experience conflict. Any such conflict would be
empirically demonstrated in the form of increased decisions ren-
dered against government positions.36 When this in fact occurs,
the conflict can thus be attributed to differing ideologies and deci-
sional propensities between the holdover Court and the newly
dominant political majority. Therefore, the Court as an institu-
tion will appear to be engaged in a judicial activist posture relative
to the federal government.37
III. DATA
The instant analysis will include all formally decided cases in
which the federal government participated as a principal litigant
during United States Supreme Court terms from 1801 to 1957.38
This inclusion of the entire universe of litigation in which the fed-
eral government was a party is done to overcome the two major
defects of previous works, namely limited samples, and too nar-
row a view of the Court's opinions.39 Therefore, using 6,120 cases
gives a much more complete profile of the interplay between the
Court and the federal government.40
36. The major hypothesis of this study is that during periods of relatively stable
national electoral coalitions, the Court and the federal government will essentially
agree on policy issues. This policy agreement will be evidenced by a substantial in-
crease in favorable decisions for the government in cases where it is a principal liti-
gant. Such harmony, therefore, represents period of apparent judicial restraint.
Alternatively, following partisan realignment, the Court and the new electoral coali-
tion will experience conflict, traditionally manifested in the form of an increased per-
centage of unfavorable decisions rendered against the government when it again is a
principal litigant.
37. For a developed discussion and further analysis on the relative conflicts be-
tween the Court and the federal legislative branch, concentrating on congressional
reaction to judicial activism, see Handberg & Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals,
and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 L. & Soc. REV. 309
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Handberg & Hill, Court Curbing].
38. Data beyond the 1957 term was excluded because insufficient historical per-
spective exists as to whether another electoral realignment has actually occurred.
Data prior to 1801 was excluded as well because of a paucity of cases and the problem
of incomplete records.
39. R. Handberg & H. Hill, Jr., The Supreme Court and Electoral Majority:
1801-1958, paper presented at Annual meeting of Southern Political Science Associa-
tion (New Orleans, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Handberg & Hill, paper] [on file in the
offices of California Western Law Review].
40. The definition of cases excludes cases which may have involved important
policy issues to the federal government, but were cases in which the federal govern-
ment did not participate as a principal litigant. As well, the present analysis ignores
certain qualitative differences between cases. In effect we treat a contract action
against a government supplier as equal to a major constitutional case. Obviously, the
8
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For purposes of this analysis, an unfavorable decision will be
operationalized as a case in which the Court: (a) directly ruled
against the federal government, (b) rejected the federal govern-
ment's arguments or rationales (at least as is identifiable in the
opinion), or (c) denied motions or petitions requested by the Un-
tied States government. Favorable decisions will thus be opera-
tionalized in diametrically opposed situations.41
Additionally, the electoral realignment periods used for this ex-
amination are derived from the earlier critiques by Paul Beck,42
Cannon and Ulmer,43 those being the periods 1821-1828, 1853-
1860, 1889-1896, and 1929-1936. It should be noted here that al-
though insurgent political coalitions may not have actually gained
control of both houses of Congress and the Presidency during
these periods, in all cases the political winds were rising." There-
fore, the critical election periods used here become important
when relying upon Funston's "Dahl-Dooley Hypothesis" that
"the Supreme Court follows the election returns. '45 The reason
these periods become important is, if the hypothesis is true, the
justices would have conformed their behavior to the new order,
even before changes occurred in court personnel. Furthermore,
and realistically speaking, justices are not vestal virgins uncon-
taminated by national political currents. Thus, even in their rela-
tive isolation, although the degree of involvement obviously varies
between individual justices,46 the justices, in general, are often
heavily involved in politics. 47
In conjunction with the above stated realignment periods, "lag
periods" are also identified to annex the periods where the new
dominant political coalition took control of Congress, but not the
Court. These four lag periods, also derived from the earlier stated
critiques,48 existed during the periods 1829-1836, 1861-1865, 1897-
1909, and 1930-1940. During these periods, the legislative branch
absence of a qualitative variable limits our analysis somewhat, but does not disturb
the essential decisional patterns. Notably, similar methodological treatments have
been profitably used in other contexts. See e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND
REvISITED (1974) and Leloup & Shull, Congress Versus the Excecutive: The Two Pre-
sidencies Reconsidered, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 704 (1979).
41. A breakdown of the substantive issue catagories by the Chief Justice is
presented in Handberg & Hill, paper, supra note 39 and Handberg & Hill, Court
Curbing, supra note 37, at 309-22 (1980). For an extension of a part of this analysis
into the 1970's, see Handberg, Supreme Court, supra note 5.
42. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
44. Beck, CriticalElections, supra note 25; Cannon & Ulmer, The Supreme Court,
supra note 26, at 1215.
45. Funston, The Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 796.
46. See generally P. McGRATH, MORISON R. WAITE (1963).
47. B.A. MuRPHY, THE BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982).
48. See supra notes 42 and 43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20
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was controlled by the new majority. Its legislation, certainly re-
flecting new governmental policy, came before the holdover Court
which, at least philosophically, was ambivalent about the
proposals.
IV. ANALYSIS
Generally, the Supreme Court's decisional pattern has been one
of judicial restraint. However, this pattern of supporting the gov-
ernment's position is not unexpected given the traditional position
of restraint assigned to the Court.49 In fact, throughout the entire
period under consideration (1801-1958), the government averaged
an aggregate success rate of sixty-two percent, although during the
pre-Civil War period it was at a lower rate of fifty-seven percent.50
Similarly, the Court workload reflected the changing and ex-
panding role of government. 5 ' Manifestly, as governmental activ-
ity became more extensive, the Court became more actively
involved in determining the permissible boundaries of such activi-
ties. However, the Court's role should still be characterized more
as that of a "yeasayer" rather that "naysayer."
Table One below presents an overview of the Court's activity
during the four major periods of political change. Column 1 rep-
resents the four year period immediately prior to periods of elec-
toral change while column 2 delineates the Court's decisional
pattern during the actual period of alteration. Column 3 shows
the results when the Court was in the "lag period." That is, where
the legislative branch had been captured by the new coalition, but
the Court had not. Finally, column 4 exhibits the Court's deci-
sional behavior in that period when both the Court and Congress
should have been complementary in terms of governmental ideo-
logical principals.
The results which Table One illustrates are that the pattern of
the Court was mixed, with the last two realignment periods falling
into more of an expected pattern. In fact, the twentieth century
pattern is completely consistent with expectations of Court reac-
tions during the respective periods of change. Therefore, Table
Two shifts the level of anlaysis from aggregate time spans to a
term by term analysis, in order to more precisely demonstrate the
Court's forms.
49. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
50. In the aggregate the bulk of the cases occurred after the Civil War, number-
ing a total of 5471.
51. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1927).
1984]
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TABLE 1
COURT SUPPORT LEVEL DURING PERIODS OF
ELECTORAL REALIGNMENT TIME PERIODS*
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EVENT Pre-Realignment** Realignment Lag Post=Lag"**
Ist Realignment 60% 65% 48% 39%
(1821-1828)
2nd Realignment 78% 60% 62% 59%
(1853-1860)
3rd Realignment 45% 61% 64% 71%
(1889-1896)
4th Realignment 66% 62% 65% 71%
(1929-1936)
Average 60% 61% 63% 67%
* Time periods are drawn from earlier discussion in Funston (1975), Beck (1976),
and Canon and Ulmer (1976).
** The pre-realignment and post-lag averaged cover the four years immediately prior
to the electoral realignment periods and the first four years after the lag period.
The realignment or critical periods and lag periods are described in the text.
In Table Two below, the examination seeks to determine
whether the Court was systematically less supportive (i.e., more
activist) toward the government during realignment and lag years
as compared to nonrealignment and nonlag years. Basically, the
table displays whether the Court's treatment of the government
positions in a particular term was above or below the aggregate
average of sixty-two percent in favor of government stands. Theo-
retically, the perfect relationship would show all nonrealign-
ment/nonlag years on or above the average, with the
realignment/lag terms below it. However, as Table Two illus-
trates there was not a significant difference in Court activity dur-
ing the respective realignment and lag periods. Thus, on a term
by term basis the Court's role is best explained as that of legiti-
mator of political change.52 This determination is appropriate
even though the aggregate patterns reported here do conceal sig-
nificant and wide variations of the individual terms.53 Whatever
the intraperiod variation, the fact is that on the whole the differ-
52. This legitimator or "yeasayer" role of the Supreme Court is supported by a
comparison of lag periods with their respective prior time periods. For example,
when the New Deal captured the Court through the replacement of several older
justices (i.e., by Justices Black and Reed) and intense political pressure, ("the switch
in time saves nine") the Court's role became that of annointer. H.C. PRiCHETr, THE
ROOSEvELT COURT (1948).
53. Such as in the 1933-40 lag period, where the range of values was from forty-
eight percent (48%) support for the government in the 1935 Court term as contrasted
with the eighty-three percent (83%) in the 1939 Court term.
11
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ence in the level of Court activity is not that striking or
inconsistent.
TABLE 2
COURT ACTIVITY PATTERNS IN REALIGNMENT AND
LAG TIME PERIODS
Realignment Lag
yearly average yearly average
above above
or on or on
below the below the
mean* mean mean mean
Nonrealignment 52% 48% Non lag 50% 50%
100% 100%
(65) (60) (62) (61)
Court Court
Terms Terms
Realignment' 47% 53% Lag2  53% 47%
100% 100%
(15) (17) (18) (16)
(N=157) (N= 157)
chi square = .2677 chi square = .068
Yule's Q = .102 Yule's Q = -. 05
= 62%
1 1821-1828, 1853-1860, 1889-1896, 1929-1936
2 1829-1836, 1861-1865, 1897-1909, 1933-1940
At this point the analysis shifts to consider whether declines in
Court support levels for the government correspond with in-
stances of judicial review. This is done since earlier approaches
by Dahl and Funston used the power of judicial review as their
measure of Court behavior.54
Prior to the 1930's judicial review was a relatively rarely used
weapon in the Court's arsenal.5 5 Thus, the hypothesis adopted
here is that when the Court signifies its disagreement with the leg-
islative majority by striking down a statute as unconstitutional, a
decrease in the Court's aggregate level of support for the govern-
ments position will also occur. The two main decisional options-
a declaration of unconstitutionality, or the rejection of the govern-
ment's position as litigant without a finding of unconstitutional-
ity-will most dramatically evidence the Court's lack of support.
The former is of course more extreme and final, but both are re-
54. See supra notes 9, 10, 18, 19, 22, 23 and 24 and accompanying text.
55. ABRAHAM, supra note 30; Handberg, Judicial Review and the Supreme Court:
An Accelerating Curve, 2 NOVA L.J. 1, 3-4 (1978).
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lated events rather than disjointed behavior. In any event, in or-
der to isolate this relationship, this anlaysis compares the Court's
term support rate with whether or not a congressional statute was
declared unconstitutional during that Court term. Thus, for the
aforementioned hypothesis to hold true, when Court support
levels fall below the mean, instances of judicial review, more pre-
cisely findings of unconstitutionality, should occur.
Finally, Table Three below, represents a relationship between
the Court's aggregate support level and its proclivity to declare
legislation unconstitutional.5 6 In this table when the Court's ag-
gregate support pattern falls below the mean score, the level of
Court willingness to strike down legislation increased. The find-
ings here are important, because they demonstrate how the Court
systematically rejected governmental activity, generally, as op-
posed to only certain isolated and episodic instances. The results
indicate a strong linkage between instances of judicial review and
statutory interpretation. This situation exists because as govern-
TABLE 3*
COMPARISON OF THiE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Post Civil War
Government Success
on or
below above
mean' mean
unconstitutional 62.5% 37.5%
(30) (18)
Court
Terms2
none occurred 35.6% 64.4%
(16) (29)
chi square = 6.747, p < .01
Yules Q = .503
n = 93
* Cases drawn from Henry J. Abraham, "he Judicial Process 3rd Ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1975), Table 9, pp. 288-293.
IX = 63%
2Court Terms refers to whether a congressional statute was in fact held unconstitu-
tional or not during the term. Each term is coded as a yes (unconstitutional) or no
(none occurred).
56. Table 3 uses the aggregate mean for the 1865 to 1958 time period because of
the paucity of cases of judicial review prior to the Civil War (only two). During the
Civil War, the Court shed its reluctance, comparatively speaking, to use its power of
judicial review therefore allowing a more detailed analysis of the general conditions
attached to the exercise of judicial review. This allowed a more detailed analysis of
the general conditions attached to the exercise of judicial review.
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ment losses increased at the statutory interpretation level, the
Court became more predisposed to exercise its authority and de-
clare statutes unconstitutional. Although it is difficult to deter-
mine which occurence was the catalyst for the other, it is clear that
these acts appear strongly interrelated. Moreover, most probably
the two events are mutually reinforcing.
CONCLUSION
The present analysis demonstrates, at least at an aggregate
level, that the Supreme Court as an institution has been immersed
in the political currents of the day. Apparently, there is a broad
range of factors which influence the individual justices to engage
in what is termed judicial activism and restraint. However, al-
though individual ideological and personal traits may have influ-
enced a justice's inclination toward certain behavior, the
opportunities for any such activity were heavily influenced by the
political environment.
This Article has statistically illustrated that the Court has been
linked to the dominant political forces of the day. Furthermore,
the findings have revealed that the primary role of the Court in
this context was to legitimize governmental power. When evi-
denced, the Court's resistance to change was normally a short-
lived experience, usually an accomodation solidified when the in-
evitable changes in the Court's membership occurred. Obviously,
the Court at times opposed the political tide, but such efforts were
often futile or successful only on issues of limited importance.
Thus, delay or goal modification seem to establish the Court's
most successful weapons, especially when such interference was
supported by political and social forces within the American
society. 57
The Court's behavior can be interpreted differently depending
upon individual ideological perspectives. That is, the Court may
be perceived as supporting the government nearly two thirds of
the time and thus serves as a yeasayer or in other words, main-
tains a posture of judicial restraint. Conversely, the focus can be
on the one-third of the cases which the government lost, therefore,
engaging the Court in judicial activism as a naysayer. One thing
is certain, however, the Court's bias has been to support the domi-
nant political coalition and not waste valuable institutional re-
sources on the losers.58 Although restraint is more likely to occur
57. Adamany, Legitimacy, supra note 16, at 846.
58. The difficulty, historically, is that those being "protected" are often those
least in apparent need of protection. In fact, one could argue that the Court's only
1984]
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than activism, it should always be noted that justices in the short
term can distort the balance because of their personal interest in
particular issues or goals.
consistent historical passion for an oppressed minority has been when the oppressed
are the economic overdog. The Court's most visible and politically dangerous acts
have occurred in defending individual and corporate government regulation. In civil
liberties cases, the Court's more usual ploy has been that of statutory interpretation as
in the gyrations relative to the Smith Act. The Court's function is that of referee
among competing interests but the Court should be an unbiased referee.
[Vol. 20
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